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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. ERISHMAN and 
DARYLENE L. ERISHMAN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
MARR B. OVERMAN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
., 
------
RESPONDENT 
BRIEF OF 
Case No. 9226 
STATE:NIENT OF FACTS 
On the 20th day of March, 1957, the plaintiffs and 
the defendants entered into an agreement for the sale and 
purchase of a hon1e located in Logan, Utah. Prior to the 
signing of the contract, the plaintiffs had signed a written 
listing agreement and gave the same to an agent of the 
Utah Mortgage Loan Company, a real estate agency. On 
the listing there was given certain information as to the im-
provements on the ho1ne and the property, among which 
it was listed, that there was Sewer connecting the home 
to the Logan City Sewer System, when in fact no such 
sewer or connection existed. It was admitted by the 
plainttiff that he gave this false info1mation as to the 
sewer connection. It was this listing that was shown to 
the defendant a \von1an with 5 children who was lookincr 
b 
for a home. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-3-
The Defendant visited the premises and went over 
the listing with the real estate agent. She found that 
everything was as listed as far as she was able to observe 
vvhen visiting the premises. The Defendant testified that 
she relied on the listing. 
R-17 
Q You didn't ask Mr. Baugh about it other than to 
observe the listing? 
A Yes, I did. That is, I didn't ask him. He quoted 
to me that "I have a home that is connected to 
the sewer, it's down close to the school; it's within 
walking distance from town," and he said, it's 
completely furnished." 
And it was frankly admitted by the Plaintiff that the 
false information as to the sewer connection was given by 
the Plaintiff in the listing agreement to the Utah Mortgage 
Loan Agent, and that Mr. Baugh's statement was taken 
from information gained therefrom. The transaction sub-
stantially was carried on in reliance on the listing agree-
ment and there was very little negotiation between Mrs. 
Overman and the Plaintiff personally. Mrs. Overman 
entered into possession of the property on March 20, 1957 
and made a dovm payment of $500.00 which left a balance 
due of $5,650.00, bearing interest at 5o/o per annum. There 
was a monthly payment due under the contract of $50.74. 
The first monthly payment was May 1, 1957. Everything 
went smoothly until July 18, 1958 when the Defendant 
found that she needed repairs to the home to an extent 
greater than she had ready cash to take care of and on 
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July 18, 1959, a letter was written to the Plaintiffs explain-
ing the circumstances and proposing a refinancing arrange-
ment, wherein the Plaintiff would have received $1500.00 
cash and substantially the same monthly payment on a 
second mortgage (Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 ) . 
On August 12, 1958, the Defendant received a letter 
indicating that they were willing to take the refinancing 
arrangement (Defendant's Exhibit No. 2). About the 
same time the Defendant began to have trouble with the 
sewer system and sewage backed up into her basement. 
In investigating the sewer difficulty, it was discovered 
that the home was not connected to the Logan City sewer 
system as it was represented to be by the Plaintiffs in the 
listing, and as she had understood it to be when she pur-
chased the property. On August 30, 1958, the Defendant 
wrote a letter and informed the Plaintiff that the home 
was not connected to the sewer system, as it had been re-
presented to her to be, and that it would be necessary for 
her to make the connection in order to make the home 
livable. She also told the Plaintiffs the approximate cost 
involved in making the sewer connection, and asked them 
what they would be willing to do in taking care of the 
same. (Exhibit No.3). 
In answer to the letter of August 30, 1958, the Plain-
tiff wrote (Exhibit No. 4) "Since we listed the house as 
being connected to the sewer, although we were not 
cognizant of the fact it was not, we feel that an allowance 
of $100.00 is all we can make. This allowance of $100.00 
can be deducted from the amount owed when the second 
mortgage arrangements are made." 
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It should be noted by the Court that the parties were 
still negotiating both a settlement as to the sewer con-
nection and arranging details for refinancing as of Sep-
tember 8, 1958, and that the Plaintiffs admitted their 
responsibility for the sewer, but did not offer to take care 
of the full cost or the out-of-pocket expenses caused by the 
necessity to install the missing sewer. 
The Defendant made no payments under the contract 
after she discovered that the sewer was not connected, and 
she continued to try and settle the matter. In her letter 
marked Defendant's Exhibit No.5 she informed the Plain-
tiff that she was entitled to all of the costs of the sewer 
installation, credited on the escrow agreement. The mat-
ter continued on without credit being given or any agree-
ment being made as to a settlement for the payment of 
the sewer until March 11, 1959, when the Plaintiffs served 
notice on the Defendant declaring a forfeiture of the es-
crow agreement. 
On ~1ay 22, 1959, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint 
asking for damages for wrongful detainer and alleging 
that the contract was null and void because of failure in 
payments from September 1, 1958. 
The Defendant filed an Answer and Counter Claim 
wherein the Defendants alleged that the contract would 
not have been entered into except for the false representa-
tion as to the condition of the home and that it was con-
nected to the Logan City Sewer, and the Defendants 
asked for relief which would essentially restore the parties 
to the status quo. 
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ARGUMENT POINT I 
There was ample evidence to support the court's find-
ing of fact No. 3. 
Jl.-34 Direct examination of Defendant: 
Q You didn't ask Mr. Baugh about it other than to 
observe the listing? 
A Yes, I did. That is, I didn't ask him. He quoted 
to me that "I have a home that is connected to 
the sewer, it's down close to the school, it's within 
walking distance ~rom town," and he said, "it's 
completely furnished." 
R-Page 34 c'And will you state to the jury, why you 
wouldn't have entered into this contract.'' 
A. I borrowed money to make the down payment on 
the contract. I was working on a shoe string. 
If I had thought for one minute that I would have 
additional expense for the connection of the 
sewer I would never have entered into it. 
Q "That is you wouldn't have entered into the con-
tract under the same terms. 
A "That's right." 
Exhibit 11 shows the listing agreement and that it 
listed the sewer and the connection. It is this same listing 
that was checked over by Mrs. Overman. Also that there 
was substantial evidence in the record to support finding 
in Fact number 7. 
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The Plaintiff testified as to all of the costs of the 
improvements and the defendant's witness, George Judah, 
testified as to their effect on the market value of the pro-
perty. 
R-60 Mr. Judah testified that he was acquainted with 
the property in question and that he had examined the 
property just prior to the time that Mrs. Overman pur-
chased it and that he was acquainted with the position 
of the furnace in the home and its general condition. He 
also testified that he had examined the furnace just prior 
to the trial and knew the condition of the new heating 
system which had been installed and that all of the 
changes that had been made had been desirable and had 
increased the value of the home. 
Mr. Judah was asked if he had an opinion as to how 
much the heating system had improved the value of the 
home. He stated that the actual cost would be as close as 
he could come to a reasonable value of the appreciation 
of the property as a result of the improvement, and that 
this would be between $700 and $800, and that $800 would 
not be unreasonably high figure. 
R-65 Mr. Judah testified that the improvements to the 
back steps would also add to the value of the home the 
cost involved. The Plaintiff R-32 testified that the ma-
terial for the back porch and steps cost $123.00 and that 
the labor was $81.00. The sewer connection cost an 
additional $239.00 giving a total of out-of-pocket expenses 
of $1,243.00. He also testified that after considering a 
five or six percent depreciation in the property that it 
would be sold for around $7,000.00 or a little better. This 
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would put the appreciation of the p.roperty at $900,00. 
Therefore, there was evidence to support the jury in a 
special verdict at R-11 where the jury found after hearing 
the testimony of all of the witnesses and visiting and in-
specting the premises and being instructed by the Court 
found that the reasonable value of the improvements made 
by the Defendant was $837.00. 
It is stated in the Appellants Brief that because a 
sewer connection was not mentioned in the Escrow Agree-
ment that it was not a part of the contract and that the 
Plaintiffs did not intend· to convey the property with a 
sewer connection. In this respect the respondents refer 
the court to the listing agreement (Exhibit 11) and also 
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4 wherein the Plaintiff admits that 
he did in fact intend to convey a sewer with the property. 
As the sewer was a part of the real property it was 
not necessary to specifically state in the contract that 
there was to be a sewer connection as it would be con-
veyed in the general description of the real property and 
in this case all of the parties have admitted in court that 
it was intended to be so. 
The Respondent points out to the Court that it is not 
relying for its relief on the doctrine of fraud or deceit, but 
rather on a material misrepresentation of fact. It is con-
tended that the quotation, taken from the 24 Am. Jur. 
Section 32, Page 377, Fraud and Deceit, does in fact sup-
port the Defendant's position, even though in this case 
we are not relying on fraud. · 
The Plaintiff has directed the Court to the Testimony 
of Grant W. Campbell to show that there was no increased 
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efficiency due to the change over from propane gas to 
natural gas. It should be pointed out in this respect that 
on the cross examination of Mr. Campbell that he was not 
sure of the year in which the gas bills were incurred which 
he referred to on direct examination and that some of the 
gas bills were probably from years prior to the time she 
took possession of the property in question and made it 
impossible to distinguish what the actual fuel bills were 
for the Erishman home. 
R-78 
Q You wouldn't know whether it was 1956, 57, or 
57-58. 
A That is correct. 
Q It's 57-58? 
A I don't say that sir. 
R-84 
Q Now, if in fact Mrs. Overman didn't move into 
the house until some time in March of 1957, and 
I make an offer of proof to that extent, your 
honor, can explain why your records would show 
that you made deliveries to Mrs. Overman Oc-
tober 12, December 19, and January 28 of 1956? 
A It's just like I told you a few moments ago. I 
wasn't sure on the date today, but I know that 
when maybe I should clarify myself a little more 
on one factor, Sir. When she converted to natural 
gas, it became necessary that I pick up a tank 
that she had. 
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It is submitted that although the plaintiffs witness, 
Mr. Campbell, made some definite statements on his 
direct examination as to the actual costs of heating with 
propane gas by Mrs. Overm~ that his cross examination 
makes it quite clear that he was not even sure that the 
charges were made for gas used in the home in question 
or that they were all charges for gas. However, he did 
make one point clear and that was that it was cheaper to 
heat with Natural gas than with propane gas. 
R-82 and R-83 
Q An where there is natural gas available, isn't it 
generally considered cheaper to operate from 
natural gas than it is propane gas? 
A Yes, Sir. 
Q Considerably cheaper, isn't it? 
A I have heard statements anywhere from one per 
cent up to sixty-five per cent. 
Q Do you have an opinion yourself as to how much? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Would you state that? 
A Approximately fifteen per cent. 
Q So in any event, even if you had a propane system 
there that was adequate, it would have a ten-
dencv to enhance the value of the house because 
.' 
it would be cheaper to heat it with natural gas, 
wouldn't it? 
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A I don't know that it would enhance the value of 
the home. It would decrease the living cost of 
the home. 
It is submitted that the jury and the court had sub-
stantial evidence to support the jury verdict. 
The Plaintiff in her brief on Page 13 argues that the 
sewer was not considered important by the parties as it 
was not mentioned specifically, in the agreement which 
was not the final contract entered into by the parties, and 
that for that reason it cannot be considered as an im-
portant item. It should be noted that both of the parties 
in their testin1ony which was not objected to at the trial, 
admitted that the sewer was taken into consideration and 
the Plaintiff frankly admits that he intended to sell pro-
perty connected to the Logan City Sewer, and the Defen-
dant in her testimony as set out R-15 that she intended to 
purchase property connected to the Logan City sewer. 
This fact is borne out by the entire record, and the im-
portance of this fact was testified to by the Defendant in 
that she stated that she had to borrow money to make 
the down payment and that every item that might increase 
the price was certainly important to her. It is also clear 
that a sewer which had been represented to exist by the 
Plaintiff buried in the ground is not an easy item to separ-
ate from the real property and it necessarily is included 
along with the general description of the real property 
which is to be conveyed and it is not an item which would 
have to be specifically set apart to make sure that it did 
go with the real property. The Defendant did check over 
the items in the listing and all that she was able to see 
bv her examination of the property indicated that the 
.I 
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listing was correct. It is submitted that the examination 
would not reasonably raise any suspicion on the part of 
the Defendant that the sewer which they could not see 
by a visual examination was not actually as represented. 
The Plaintiff states that the earnest money receipt 
and offer of purchase which was entered into on March 
16, 1957,_ was controlling as to what was considered im-
portant by the parties and that because the sewer con-
nection was not marked on that agreement, that it cannot 
be considered as important. . It is pointed out by the 
respondent that this was not the final contract of the 
parties and that none of the improvements were listed 
for the simple reason that this was not the final contract. 
The final agreement which does not provide a special 
square to be crossed out for sewer connection was entered 
into on March 20, 1957, and it is Defendant's contention 
that the general description of the real property by meets 
and bounds included the sewer with the general descrip-
tion, which was represented in the escrow agreement and 
was intended to be covered as such by both of the parties. 
POINT 2 
THE ATTE~1PT AT FORFEITURE \VAS NOT 
EFFECTIVE. 
It is alleged by the appellants that the contract had 
been forfeited and that because of such forefeiture the 
contract was not subject to recision at the time of this 
trial. However, at the time that the Plaintiffs attempted 
their fodeiture under the provisions of the contract, there 
were certain credits that were due to the Defendant by 
reason of the Plaintiffs misrepresentation and the parties 
had been negotiating for the settlement of the same, but 
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no agreement had been reached. Under these circum-
stances, the courts were generally in accord that a for-
feiture could not be declared and advantage be taken of 
a forfeiture clause while the vendor is in default. 134 
A.L.R. 1065. 
VENDEE'S RIGHT TO RECOVER BACK AMOUNT 
PAID UNDER EXECUTORY CONTRACT FOR SALE 
OF LAND. 
Approaching the matter somewhat differently, it may 
be said that there is good ground for distinguishing be-
tween the case of a vendee a refund from a vendor who 
stands on a subsisting cantract which he is able to per-
form, and who demands specific performance, or damages 
as for total breach by the vendee, and a case where the 
vendor, because of his own default or inability to perform 
is not able to confront the vendee with an obligation of 
continued performance. In the first case the contract 
remains alive for all purposes and bars a recovery by the 
vendee, since, according to the general American Doctrine, 
his obligation to perform excludes any right to a refund. 
But in the second case, the vendor's acts or the circum-
stances as to the title or otherwise, may relieve the ven-
dee of any obligation to continue performance and at the 
same time free him of any liability to forfeiture, since the 
cases are generally inconsistent with the idea that a vendor 
in default may enforce a forfeiture. The case now before 
the court is one where vendor had materially misrepre-
sented the property to the defendant vendee and this was 
discovered prior to the plaintiff claiming any default and 
after this the defendant claimed that she was entitled to 
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certain credits which she was never given. There was no 
dispute that the defendant was entitled to some credit 
but the parties were still attempting to negotiate a settle-
ment when the plaintiff attempted to declare a forfeiture. 
Carpenter vs. First Trust & Savings Bank 54 P2d 
495 has been cited by the Appellant to show that 
assurances by the vendor that improvements would 
be replaced, was not grounds to justify a delay of the 
vendee of giving notice of her election to rescind. It 
is pointed out that in that case the court found that 
the evidence did not support a finding that such 
assurances had been given and upheld a finding by 
the lower court that such assurances had not been 
given. 
It is suggested that in fact because of the wording 
used, that such assurances would justify a delay in the 
vendee making an election. 
The Defendant had demanded that the cost of the 
sewer connection be credited in full to the payments on 
the contract, and the plaintiff had offered to pay only 
$100.00 or only about half of the price. 
Rienhart vs. Welchaman, Oregon case 65 P2nd 1420, 
134 A.LR. 
"Where the time of the esssence provision of the 
contract had been waived the court seemed to con-
cede that an ineffectual attempt to forfeit the con-
tract by unreasonably short notice and a retaking of 
the land would have rendered the vendor liable to 
return what had been paid on the contract. 
The letters, Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4 make it clear that 
the Plaintiff had waived by his action any claim up to 
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September 8, 1958, any claim for forfeiture due to late 
payments and that at that time there was in dispute the 
exact amount due on the contract and the amount which 
was to be credited for the cost of the sewer connection, 
and Defendants Exhibit No. 5 was September 19, 1958, 
makes a demand for the actual cost of the sewer con-
nection in the sum of $243.30. Under these circumstances, 
the law is clear that the plaintiff was in no position to take 
advantage of the forfeiture clause of the contract. That 
there could be no continuing default on the part of the 
Defendant as long as the damages had not been deter-
mined or a settlement had been reached as to the damages 
caused by the false representation of the Plaintiff. The 
Defendant made her position clear by refusing any further 
payment on the contract until these matters were cleared 
up, and no payments were made after the discovery that 
the sewer was not connected. Therefore, the attempt 
to declare a forfeiture, under these circumstances, would 
be of no effect in cancelling the rights of the Defendant 
under the contract or which may have arisen due to the 
misrepresentation of the Plaintiff's vendor. 
The appellants have cited the Case of Peck vs. Judd 
226 P2d 712 for the proposition that the defendant 
had waived her right to recover for the misrepresen-
tation be cause of the delay in giving up the property. 
This case can be distinguished on several points, 
( 1 ) there was no showing in this case of any mislead-
ing as to adjustments to take care of the fraud or any 
new contract which the parties had tentatively agreed 
to enter into which was the reason for the delay as 
in the present case, as is clearly shown by the letters 
which were entered into evidence. Also, the cited 
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case involves an apartment house where there were 
large sums of money paid in rent to the d~fendant 
each month which was clearly prejudicial to the rights 
of the plaintiff. 
POINT 3 
THAT THE DEFENDANT RESPONDENT WAS EN-
TITLED TO RECOVER ALL IMPROVEMENTS THE 
AMOUNT TO \VHICH THEY HAD ENHANCED IN 
MARKET VALUE THE HOME AND ALL MONEY 
PAID IN RELIANCE ON THE CONTRACT MINUS 
A REASONABLE RENTAL VALUE FOR THE PRO-
PERTY WHILE SHE WAS IN POSSESSION. 
The right to relief in this type of a case is set out in 
9 Am. Jur. Cancellation of Contracts, Section 40, Page 
385. "On the other hand, a vendee in possession who 
rescinds a contract for the sale of land because of the 
misrepresentation of the vendor is entitled to the purchase 
money paid, the value of permanent improvements erected 
in good faith, th~ amount of taxes paid, and interest on 
these several sums deducting from the aggregate the value 
of the rent while the vendee remained in possession. As 
to the latter item, however, it should be noted that the 
vendee will not be obliged to pay rent in excess of the 
profits actually receiv~d." 
There was no reason for Mrs. Ove1man to doubt, after 
receiving the letter from Mr. Erishn1an, but that the mis-
representation as to the sewer was the result of an honest 
mistake on the part of Mr. Erishman, and under these 
circumstances, she had a duty to give him an opportunity 
to corr~ct his mistake and she had every re~son to believe 
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that it would be taken care of in a reasonable manner. 
This is evident from the correspondence of the party in 
Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
Kerns vs. Bank of Mantou, 242 Pac. 2nd 817 
In this case the plaintiff was sold a parcel of land 
and in checking over the land actually conveyed, 
found that it was not the same land as had been repre-
sented and the defendant claimed that he had waived 
his rights to recision because of paying the taxes and 
finding a buyer for the property after he knew of the 
mistake. 
The court held that these were not acts of domin-
ion over the property, as the plaintiff had a duty to 
protect the property and maintain it in order to pre-
serve his right to recision. 
In the case before the court the defendant was 
placed in a similar position when the sewer stopped 
working the home became unlivable and it became 
necessary to replace the sewer to maintain the value 
of the property and backing of the Sewer caused the 
back steps to become unusable and it was necessary 
to repair them in order to maintain the property, also 
the repairs to the ceilings were certainly an item 
necessary to the maintenance of the property. 
Certainly all of these items were such as would 
mitigate the damages of the defendants which the 
defendant had a duty to do at least to a reasonable 
extent. 
9 Am. Jur.- Cancellation of Instruments, Sec. 32, 
pp. 377 and 78. 
The jurisdiction of equity to decree the cancellation 
of an instrument because of the time of its execution the 
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parties, or even one of them, labored under a mistake of 
fact, provided that such mistake is material to the transac-
tion and affects the substance thereof, rather than a mere 
incident or the inducement for entering into it, is well 
recognized and frequently invoked, especially if an ele-
ment of fraud is present or a confidential relationship 
exists. This rule is applicable whether the instrument 
rel~tes to an executory agreement of one that has been 
executed. However, before granting relief it must be 
made to appear that the fact concerning which the mistake 
was made was one that animated and controlled the con-
duct of the parties. The court must be satisfied that but 
for the mistake the complainant would not have assumed 
the obligation from which he seeks to be relieved. 
A contract will not be rescinded for a mistake in favor 
of the complainant, correction of which, upon its dis-
covery, he refused to allow. 
It is clear that any of the improvements which the 
court allowed the defendant to recover for were improve-
ments which would be reflected in the increased sale 
value of the home and would be a windfall to the plaintiff. 
This would be rewarding the plaintiff for his mis-
leading the defendant into believing that he would agree 
to a refinancing arrangement and that the misrepresen-
tation as to the sewer connection was only and honest 
mistake for which she could expect a reasonable compen-
sation. The plaintiff had been planning to make the im-
provements prior to her discovery of the sewer problem 
and that to allow the plaintiff to recover the improvements 
which had been put on the property as a result of his 
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own misleading would be contrary to the rules of equity 
whic should govern the court in setting the damages in a 
case of this kind. The general rules of restoring the 
defendant to the status quo which should govern the court 
in a case of this kind does not limit the court in all cases 
to the time of the discovery of an honest mistake or mis-
representation. These rules are set out in 9 Am. Jur. Sec. 
39, Page 384. 
"Restoration of Defendant to Status Quo. Under the 
maxim of equity that he who seeks equity must do equity, 
the plaintiff in an action to cancel or rescind an instru-
ment must generally, as a condition of obtaining such 
relief, restore the defendant to the position which he 
occpied before the transaction in question. The plaintiff 
is generally required to restore or offer to restore, the bene-
fits he has received, not as a condition of acquiring the 
right to sue, but because of the equitable maxim that he 
who seeks equity must do equity. Certainly the plaintiff 
will not be allowed to derive any unconscionable advan-
tage from the cancellaion and usually he will be denied 
relief when it is not possible sustantially to restore the 
defendant to the status quo. The mere inability of the 
plaintiff to make restoration does not relieve him of his 
obligation to do so, or permit the court to grant him relief. 
Thus, a vendor of land who sues in equity to rescind a 
conveyance or cancel a recorded contract to convey, will 
be required to restore the consideration received by him. 
CONCLUSION 
That as this is an attempt by appellants to enforce a 
forfeiture provision at a time when they themselves were 
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in default because of their false representation as to the 
sewer, and further to limit recovery by respondents be-
cause they were able to get the defendant to believe that 
they were willing to make proper adjustments, and lead 
her to beleive that they would allow refinancing to take 
care of improvements on the home, that a Court of Equity 
should not allow them to have the benefit of improvements 
made as a result of this type of leading on. 
Certainly it would be unconscionable for the plaintiff 
to receive the benefits of the improvements made in re-
liance on negotiations which could be expected to lead 
her to believe that there had been an honest mistake that 
would be taken care of and also that they would agree to 
a type of refinancing so that she would be able to pay for 
these improvements. 
That under the circumstances of this case, that it was 
proper and in accordance with the laws to restore the 
defendant to the status quo by awarding to her the sums 
paid under the contract and the value of the improvements 
she had made on the home less a reasonable rental while 
she was in possession. And that the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court was supported both by the law and the facts 
as appears from record .. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAINES & DAINES 
Robert W. Daines 
David R. Daines 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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